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END OF LIFE UNCERTAINTY: TERMINAL ILLNESS, MEDICARE 
HOSPICE REIMBURSEMENT, AND THE “FALSITY” OF 
PHYSICIANS’ CLINICAL JUDGMENTS 
Jameson Steffel 
I. INTRODUCTION 
If asked to visualize what “fraud” looks like, one might envision a theft, 
a computer hacker, or falsified signatures and documents. A doctor and 
an elderly man sitting in a hospice facility, on the other hand, seem like 
unlikely culprits. Although a hospice facility and fraud may not be an 
intuitive pairing, it is estimated that fraud and inaccurate billing cost the 
federal government’s Medicare program as much as $60 billion dollars 
annually.1 Studies have linked hospice facilities to enrolling patients who 
are not terminally ill and falsifying patient documentation, among other 
appalling behaviors.2 Naturally, efforts to combat these types of behaviors 
have found their way into the United States federal courts.3 Questions 
have arisen regarding the behavior of America’s most trusted profession4, 
medical professionals, within the hospice setting.  
Relators and the Government have relied on the Federal False Claims 
Act (“FCA”) to bring actions against hospice facilities for billing 
Medicare for end-of-life care to allegedly ineligible patients.5 To prevail 
on an FCA claim, plaintiffs must prove that a claim for reimbursement 
for Medicare Hospice Benefit (“MHB”) was “false” under the FCA. Often 
central to the “false” element of the claim is the sufficiency of a doctor’s 
“clinical judgment” in labeling a patient as terminally ill.6 Recently, a 
budding circuit split has developed regarding what can deem a doctor’s 
 
 1. Ashleigh Garrison, Medicare’s Most Indefensible Fraud Hotspot: Hospice Care, CNBC (Aug. 
2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/08/02/medicares-most-despicable-indefensible-fraud-hotspot-
hospice-care.html.  
 2. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., OEI-02-16-
00570,VULNERABILITIES IN THE MEDICARE HOSPICE PROGRAM AFFECT QUALITY CARE AND PROGRAM 
INTEGRITY: AN OIG PORTFOLIO 1 (July 2018), available at https://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-02-16-
00570.pdf?utm_source=STAT+Newsletters&amp;utm_campaign=a14adc5bd9-
MR_COPY_09&amp;utm_medium=email&amp;utm_term=0_8cab1d7961-a14adc5bd9-150483829.  
 3. See infra Parts II and III. 






 5. United States v. AseraCare, Inc., 938 F.3d 1278, 1281 (11th Cir. 2019).  
 6. Id. at 1285.  
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clinical judgment as “false” for the purposes of FCA liability.7 In the 
Eleventh Circuit’s United States v. AseraCare, Inc. opinion, the court held 
that a difference in two doctors’ clinical judgments, without more, was 
insufficient to show falsity under the FCA.8 However, just six months 
later, the Third Circuit in United States v. Care Alternatives explicitly 
departed from the Eleventh Circuit’s rule, instead holding that a 
difference in expert opinion may create a triable, genuine dispute of 
material fact regarding the falsity of a doctor’s clinical judgment.9 
This Article explores the aforementioned circuit split and focuses on 
how these two recent cases have interpreted both the language of the FCA 
as well as the standards required of medical professionals by Medicare 
and the MHB. Further, based on the plain language meaning of the 
statutes and guidance, along with general policy concerns, this Article 
argues that the approach taken by the Eleventh Circuit in AseraCare is 
not only the correct legal interpretation but also the better policy 
approach.  
Part II of this Article provides a foundational understanding of the 
FCA, qui tam claims, and the current guidance provided to medical 
professionals who try to use the federal MHB for reimbursement of 
medical services provided to patients. Part II also discusses two 
background cases that initially ruled on the FCA’s “falsity” element and 
were later relied upon in the two most recent cases that split the circuits. 
Part III analyzes the two recent cases that have directly caused the split: 
United States v. AseraCare, Inc.,10 and United States ex rel. Druding v. 
Care Alternatives.11 Part IV argues that although there is a genuine need 
to combat fraud within the hospice medical arena, dueling expert 
opinions, without more, should always be considered insufficient to 
create a question of falsity under the FCA. Further, Part IV suggests that 
the appropriate avenue to combat subjective, yet questionable, clinical 
judgments of doctors is through legislation, not the courts.   
Finally, Part V concludes by summarizing the above issues and sides 
with the Eleventh Circuit’s holding in Asera Care, Inc. Overall, due to the 
naturally uncertain and subjective nature of the elderly populations’ 
health in their waning months and years on earth, medical professionals 
should be granted the deference given to them by the plain language of 
 
 7. Jessica E Joseph et al., Third Circuit Creates Budding Circuit Split in United States v. Care 
Alternatives, Ruling That "Objective Falsity" Is Not Required Under FCA, FOLEY & LARDNER LLP (Mar. 
2020), https://www.foley.com/en/insights/publications/2020/03/third-rules-objective-falsity-not-
required-fca.   
 8. AseraCare, 938 F.3d at 1281. 
 9. United States ex rel. Druding v. Care Alternatives, 952 F.3d 89, 91 (3d Cir. 2020). (“Care 
Alternatives”). 
 10. 938 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 2019).  
 11. 952 F.3d 89 (3d Cir. 2020). 
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the regulations when they make clinal judgments of terminal illness. 
Stricter scrutiny of medical professionals’ clinical judgments of terminal 
illness could result in worse health outcomes for the same patients for 
whom the MHB was initially implemented to help.12  
II. BACKGROUND 
A. The Federal False Claims Act (FCA)13 
Today, the FCA serves as a primary tool for the United States 
government to combat fraud against the government and to protect the 
federal treasury.14 The FCA’s origins are rooted in the United States Civil 
War.15 During the war, Congress received disturbing reports that detailed 
contractors defrauding the Union military in their supply contracts.16 The 
reports led to the FCA bill, which was generally well supported and 
designed to “prevent and punish frauds” upon the United States 
Government.17  
The design of the FCA was to “deputize an army of insiders to uncover, 
inform, and pursue those government contractors who knowingly cheat 
in their agreements with the government.”18 The FCA allows private 
individuals to file suit on behalf of the government through its “qui tam” 
provision.19 In this scenario, the individual bringing the suit on behalf of 
the government is referred to as a “relator.”20 A qui tam suit must be filed 
under seal and served to the U.S. Attorney General.21 The government is 
required to investigate the allegation and then may decide whether to 
intervene or decline to intervene.22 If the government chooses to 
intervene, then the government holds primary responsibility for 
prosecuting the action.23  
 
 12. See History of Hospice Care; Hospice: A Historical Perspective, NAT’L HOSPICE & 
PALLIATIVE CARE ORG., https://www.nhpco.org/hospice-care-overview/history-of-hospice/.  
 13. 31 U.S.C. § 3729. 
 14. James B. Helmer Jr., False Claims Act: Incentivizing Integrity for 150 Years for Rogues, 
Privateers, Parasites and Patriots, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 1261, 1261 (2013), available 
athttps://scholarship.law.uc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1153&context=uclr.  
 15. Id. at 1264. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 1265. (citing CONG. GLOBE, 37TH CONG., 3D SESS. 955, 348 (1863) (statement of Sen. 
Wilson)). 
 18. Id. at 1262.  
 19. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b). 
 20. The False Claims Act: A Primer, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
2,https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/civil/legacy/2011/04/22/C-FRAUDS_FCA_Primer.pdf.  
 21. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2)  
 22. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(a), (b)(4), (5).  
 23. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(1).  
3
Steffel: End of Life Uncertainty
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2021
782 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 89 
The primary incentive for a relator to bring a claim under the FCA is 
money. Those found to be in violation of the act are liable to the federal 
government for a standard monetary civil penalty plus three times the 
amount of damages which the government sustained because of the act(s) 
of the violator.24 If the government intervenes, then the relator is entitled 
to receive between fifteen and twenty-five percent of the amount 
ultimately recovered by the government.25 If the government does not 
intervene, the individual is still entitled to receive between twenty-five 
and thirty percent of whatever is recovered through the action or 
settlement.26 Successful FCA claims can often result in multimillion 
dollar payouts to the relators who originally brought the claim.27 
Generally speaking, to be found liable under the FCA, a person must 
knowingly submit a false claim or cause another to submit a false record 
or statement material to a fraudulent claim, to the United States 
government.28 The statute also encompasses conspiring to submit a false 
claim and knowingly avoiding due payments to the government.29 
Knowledge is defined by the statue to include (1) actual knowledge, (2) 
deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the submitted information, 
and (3) reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the information.30 
Importantly, the statute does not require proof of specific intent to 
defraud.31 From the above requirements, an FCA claim is broken down 
into four elements: falsity, causation, knowledge, and materiality.32 
Central to the circuit split discussed in this Article is the element of falsity. 
B. The Medicare Hospice Benefit  
Congress established the Medicare Hospice Benefit (“MHB”) in 
1983.33 The MHB shifts patient treatment from “curative” care to 
“palliative” care.34 Curative care is designed to focus on improving an 
 
 24. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a). 
 25. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1). 
 26. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(2).  
 27. Todd Yoder, DOJ Announces Four New False Claims Act Settlements, THE NAT’L L. REV. 
(Apr. 15, 2020), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/doj-announces-four-new-false-claims-act-
settlements.  
 28. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a). 
 29. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(C); 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(G). However, this does not apply to tax 
claims under the Internal Revenue Code. (31 U.S.C. § 3729(d)).  
 30. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(1). 
 31. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(1)(B). 
 32. Care Alternatives, 952 F.3d 89, 94 (3d Cir. 2020). 
 33. 48 Fed. Reg. 56,008 (Dec. 16, 1983) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 400, 405, 408, 409, 418, 420, 
421, 489).  
 34. James F. Barger, Jr., Symposium Article: Life, Death, and Medicare Fraud: The Corruption of 
Hospice and What the Private Public Partnership Under the Federal False Claims Act is Doing About It, 
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individual patient’s medical condition, where palliative care instead 
emphasizes “pain-relief, comfort, and emotional and spiritual support to 
patients with a terminal diagnosis.”35 Today, a growing number of 
individuals facing a terminal medical diagnosis choose to forgo 
traditional curative care for palliative hospice treatment. In 2016, the 
MHB provided hospice care to around 1.4 million beneficiaries, a fifty-
three percent increase from a decade earlier.36 In total, in 2016 Medicare 
reimbursed $16.7 billion for hospice related care.37  
Medicare and Medicaid programs may provide payment to hospice 
providers for healthcare service costs incurred under the Social Security 
Act.38 However, to be eligible to elect hospice care, MBH requires written 
confirmation of an individual’s diagnosis as terminally ill.39 Certification 
must be done by the physician and medical director.40 “Terminally ill” is 
defined as an individual whose medical prognosis is a life expectancy of 
six months or less.41 Further, regulations also require that clinical 
information and other documentation supporting the medical prognosis 
be filed in the medical record with the written certification of terminal 
illness.42 Therefore, a signed certification without a medically sound basis 
supporting the clinical judgment is insufficient to support the terminally 
ill clinical judgment for MHB reimbursement purposes.  
However, recognizing the limitations on science’s ability to predict 
when someone may die, the federal regulations admit that “[p]redicting 
life is not an exact science” and allow for continual recertification of 
patients who surpass their six-month timetable.43 Regulations state that 
“the hospice medical director must assess and evaluate the full clinical 
picture” when determining if a patient is, or continues to be, terminally 
ill.44 Further, the regulations note that “we have always acknowledged the 
uniqueness of every Medicare beneficiary” when determining if a patient 
meets the eligibility criteria for certification of terminally ill.45 Clearly, 
the regulations recognize that subjectivity is natural and expected in 
 
53 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 13 (2016).  
 35. Id.at 13.  
 36. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 2, at 3. 
 37. Id.  
 38. Michael W. Thomas et al., False Claims Act Actions – The Developing Case Law Regarding 
If and When Opinions Of Medical Necessity Can Be Fraudulent, 27 HEALTH LAW. 36, 37 (2015).  
 39. 42 U.S.C. § 1395f(a)(7)(A); 42 C.F.R. § 418.22(a) 
 40. 41 U.S.C. § 1395f(a)(7)(A)(i). 
 41. 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(dd)(3)(A).  
 42. 42 C.F.R. § 418.22(b).  
 43. 75 Fed. Reg. 70488 (Nov. 17, 2010); 42 U.S.C. § 1395d(d)(1) (allowing providers to collect 
reimbursement for an unlimited number of recertification periods).  
 44. 79 Fed. Reg. 50452,50471. (Aug. 22, 2014). 
 45. Id.  
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doctors’ clinical judgments of potentially terminally ill patients.  
Local Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”) contractors 
and Medicare Administrative Contractors (“MACs”) help process claims 
from hospice providers and provide eligibility criteria.46 Hospice 
professionals rely on Local Coverage Determinations (“LCDs”) that are 
produced by local MACs as guidance for analyzing whether a patient’s 
life expectancy is six months or less.47 Notably, the LCDs themselves 
state that they are non-binding and are not a list of mandatory 
requirements.48 
C. Cases at the Cross Section of FCA’s Falsity Element and Doctors’ 
Clinical Judgments 
1. Two Types of Falsity: United States ex rel. Polukoff v. St. Mark’s 
Hosp.49  
The Polukoff claim came from a former doctor-colleague of the doctor-
defendant.50 The relator, a former co-worker of the defendant, brought a 
qui tam action against the doctor for allegedly performing thousands of 
unnecessary heart surgeries.51 Under the Medicare Act, the medical 
provider received reimbursement for surgeries that were deemed 
medically “reasonable and necessary.”52 The act provided that medical 
providers must “certify the necessity of the services.”53 The complaint 
referenced industry guidelines that advised when certain heart surgeries 
were appropriate for patients who had experienced strokes, which 
contradicted the medical practices of the defendant-doctor.54 The 
defendant had performed an abnormally high number of these heart 
surgeries and performed the surgeries in his “medically unsupported 
belief” that the surgery would cure medical issues not traditionally 
connected to the surgery.55 The complaint alleged that the defendant knew 
Medicare would not pay for the surgery to treat the specific issues for 
 
 46. United States v. AseraCare, Inc., 938 F.3d 1278, 1283 (11th Cir. 2019); 79 Fed. Reg. 
50452,50471. (Aug. 22, 2014).  
 47. 79 Fed. Reg. 50452, 50471 (Aug. 22, 2014). 
 48. Id.  
 49. 895 F.3d 730 (10th Cir. 2018). 
 50. Id. at 734. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 735. 
 53. Id. (quoting 42 C.F.R. 424.10(a) (Oct. 1, 2013)).  
 54. Id. at 736, 737. (The guidelines surround potential surgery for PFO closures.).   
 55. Id. at 737. (Normally, PFO closures were not performed until a patient had experienced at least 
one stroke. The Defendant performed these surgeries in an effort to (1) prevent strokes before they 
occurred or (2) to cure migraine headaches.). Id. 
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which he performed the surgery, so the defendant instead “represent[ed] 
that the procedures had been performed based upon [the industry] . . . 
guidelines.”56 Further, the relator alleged the defendant-doctor had 
himself “create[d] . . . puncture[s]. . . in patients’” hearts, who otherwise 
did not have the heart condition.57 
The relator’s claim was based upon his contention that the defendant 
represented that the surgeries he performed “were medically reasonable 
and necessary and that this representation was false” under the FCA.58 
However, the district court ruled that “because opinions, medical 
judgments and conclusions about which reasonable minds may differ 
cannot be false for the purposes of the FCA,” the doctor’s representations 
“could not be false.”59 Therefore, the relator’s FCA claims “failed as a 
matter of law” and the district court dismissed the case.60 
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit disagreed with the district court’s holding 
that a “medical judgment concerning the necessity of a treatment could 
not be deemed false or fraudulent under the FCA.”61 Instead, the court 
held that a doctor’s certification that a procedure is reasonable and 
necessary can be false under the FCA if the surgery does not fit within 
Medicare’s definition of “reasonable and necessary.”62  
To support its holding, the Tenth Circuit relied on its previously 
developed understanding of what may be considered “false” under the 
FCA.63 Previously, the Tenth Circuit had held that “false” may mean 
either factually false or legally false.64 Factual falsity covered express 
claims that simply were false, such as a provider submitting incorrect 
information or requesting reimbursement for a service never performed.65 
Legal falsity generally covered situations when persons knowingly 
certified they were in compliance with regulations that were a “condition 
of payment” when, in fact, they were not.66 Since the relator’s complaint 
alleged that the doctor did not comply with the “reasonable and necessary 
requirement” of the regulations, the relator alleged the doctor “submitted 
legally false requests for payment.”67 Under legal falsity, the fact that the 
doctor misrepresented the reasoning for the surgery in order to meet the 
 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 738. 
 58. Id. at 739. 
 59. Id.(internal quotation marks omitted).   
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 740.  
 62. Id. at 742, 743. 
 63. Id. at 741. 
 64. Id.  
 65. Id.  
 66. Id.  
 67. Id.  
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guidelines for reimbursement meant that the doctor made a false 
statement under the FCA.68 For that reason, the Tenth Circuit held that 
the relator had “pleaded enough to . . . survive dismissal” and reversed 
the district court and remanded the case for further proceedings.69 Overall, 
the Polukoff case illustrates two theories of falsity, factual and legal, that 
may demonstrate that a defendant made a “false” statement to Medicare 
under the FCA.  
2. Piercing the Opinion Shield: United States v. Paulus70 
The Paulus case concerned a well-known cardiologist who was 
accused of defrauding Medicare by performing medically unnecessary 
surgeries and procedures for patients.71 The complaint alleged that the 
cardiologist performed procedures to place stents in patients’ arteries 
when, according to the angiograms, stents were not needed.72 The issue 
primarily concerned the reading of angiograms, which are performed to 
measure the severity of blockage in patients’ arteries.73 The plaintiffs’ 
case was built largely on the testimony of nine doctors who testified that 
the angiograms did not show the level of blockage that the defendant had 
reported in order to justify the medical procedure.74 The doctors further 
alleged the defendant “systematically exaggerated the amount of 
blockage he saw on the angiograms.”75 On the other hand, the defendant 
contended he could not have made a false statement when interpreting the 
angiograms because (1) different doctors interpret angiograms differently 
and (2) multiple studies existed which illustrated large variability in the 
percent of blockage reported among doctors based on their readings of 
angiograms.76 The defendant argued that since the studies showed large 
“inter-observer variability,” his allegedly false reporting of blockage 
could not be considered a false statement for FCA purposes.77 
At the district court level, a jury convicted the cardiologist of 
committing healthcare fraud and making false statements based on the 
jury’s belief that he exaggerated the extent of the blockage in patients.78 
 
 68. Id. at 743, 744.  
 69. Id. at 743.  
 70. 894 F.3d 267 (6th Cir. 2018). 
 71. Id. at 270. 
 72. Id. at 272. 
 73. Id. at 271.  
 74. Id. at 273, 274. Often times the defendant had reported as high as 80% blockage, when, 
according to the experts there was no blockage present in the angiograms. Id. 
 75. Id. at 274. 
 76. Id. at 272.  
 77. Id.  
 78. Id. at 270. 
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However, the district court set aside the guilty verdicts, holding that, as a 
matter of law, the plaintiffs “failed to prove falsity,” an essential element 
of the crime.79 In the court’s view, the degree of blockage was a 
“subjective medical opinion” that, based on evidence presented at trial, 
was a “difficult task” that “cardiologists frequently disagreed” over.80 
Therefore, the defendant’s statement about the degree of blockage “could 
neither be false or fraudulent.”81  
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit disagreed and overruled the district court, 
explicitly stating that the degree of blockage shown on an angiogram “is 
a fact capable of proof or disproof.”82 Moreover, the court stated that a 
“doctor who deliberately inflates the blockage he sees on an angiogram 
has told a lie; if he does so to bill . . . more . . . then he has also committed 
fraud.”83 The court’s decision rested on whether the plaintiffs could prove 
that the defendant did not honestly report what he saw on the angiogram.84 
It reasoned that if a statement was “capable of confirmation or 
contradiction” and demonstrated as untrue, this may show “that the 
defendant made a false statement” satisfying the “falsity” element of the 
offense.85 The court also clarified that “[o]rdinarily, facts are the only item 
that fits in this category; opinion – when given honestly – are almost never 
false . . . but opinions are not, and have never been, completely insulated 
from scrutiny.”86  Then, the court further deduced that “opinions may 
trigger liability for fraud when they are not honestly held.”87 For this 
reason, the court opined the defendant was convicted “for misrepresenting 
facts, not giving opinions . . . [the defendant] was charged with lying 
about the results.”88 Overall, the court suggested that medical opinions 
can be deemed false if not honestly held. Further, the way to demonstrate 
that opinions are not honestly held is to evidence underlying facts, upon 
which the opinion is based, that are capable of proof or disproof. 
 
 79. Id. at 274, 275. 
 80. Id. at 275. 
 81. Id.  
 82. Id.  
 83. Id.  
 84. Id.  
 85. Id.  
 86. Id.  
 87. Id.  
 88. Id. at 276. (The defendant “repeatedly and systematically saw one thing on the angiogram and 
consciously wrote down another, and used that misinformation to perform and bill unnecessary 
procedures. The difficulty of interpreting angiograms has no bearing on the capacity of these statements 
to be false.”). 
9
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III. THE SPLIT  
The two cases central to the circuit split both rely on the statutory 
language of the FCA and the regulations surrounding the MHB to arrive 
at different conclusions as to what exactly determines “falsity” of medical 
professionals’ clinical judgments under the FCA in the hospice setting. 
First, this Part will discuss the Eleventh Circuit’s ruling in United States 
v. AseraCare, Inc., which allows hospice providers to more easily prevail 
against FCA claims at the summary judgment stage.89 Second, this Part 
will discuss the Third Circuit’s ruling in United States v. Care 
Alternatives, which explicitly departs from the holding in United States v. 
AseraCare, Inc. by rejecting the Eleventh Circuit’s “objective falsehood” 
standard.90 The practical result of the Care Alternatives ruling is that 
relators and the government are more likely to survive the summary 
judgment stage and create a triable issue of fact simply by providing 
dueling expert opinions.91  
A. United States v. AseraCare, Inc. 
The AseraCare litigation arose from three former AseraCare 
employees who, acting as qui tam relators, alleged that AseraCare had 
practices of knowingly submitting unsubstantiated Medicare claims in 
violation of the FCA.92 The Government chose to intervene in the suit.93 
The Government further alleged that AseraCare knowingly employed 
reckless business practices that enabled AseraCare to receive Medicare 
reimbursement for patients who were not eligible for MHB because it was 
“financially lucrative” and, thus, misspent millions of Medicare dollars.94  
The Government’s case fell under the “false certification” theory of 
FCA liability.95 Liability under this theory arises when a defendant falsely 
“implies that it has complied with a statutory or regulatory requirement” 
when, in fact, it has not.96 The Government first found over 2,000 hospice 
patients that AseraCare billed Medicare for at least 365 continuous days 
of hospice care and, within that group, created a sample of 223 patients.97 
 
 89. Supra Part III.A.  
 90. Supra Part III.B. 
 91. Id.  
 92. United States v. AseraCare, Inc., 938 F.3d 1278, 1282 (11th Cir. 2019). 
 93. Id.at 1284.  
 94. Id. (“The complaint described a corporate climate that pressured sales and clinical staff to meet 
aggressive monthly quotas for patient intake and . . . discouraged meaningful physician involvement in 
eligibility determinations”). 
 95. Id.  
 96. Id.  
 97. Id.  
10
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 89, Iss. 3 [2021], Art. 8
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol89/iss3/8
2021] END OF LIFE UNCERTAINTY 789 
Then, the Government relied on the expert testimony of a doctor who 
identified 123 patients from that sample pool who, in his opinion, were 
ineligible for MHB when AseraCare filed for its Medicare 
reimbursement.98 Centrally, the doctor, in his medical opinion, did not 
believe that the medical records of the identified patients supported 
AseraCare’s certification of terminal illness, since the records did not 
support a life expectancy of six months or less.99 The doctor made clear 
that his testimony was a reflection only of his own clinical judgment and 
that he did not think that a doctor who held a belief counter to his was 
“necessarily wrong.”100 AseraCare presented its own expert whose 
testimony “directly contradicted” the Government doctor’s expert 
testimony.101 
At the heart of the disagreement between the experts was how exactly 
medical professionals should analyze patient life expectancy.102 
According to the Government expert, physicians should use a “checkbox 
approach” that assesses terminal illness by comparing the patient’s 
medical records to LCD and medical guidelines to determine a specific 
diagnosis that would deem the patient “terminally ill” under MHB 
guidelines.103 On the other hand, AseraCare’s experts “considered but did 
not formulaically apply the LCD guidance in making their assessment.”104 
Overall, the approach presented by AseraCare was a more “holistic” 
approach compared to the more objective standard suggested by the 
Government’s expert.105 
It is important to understand the AseraCare case’s nontraditional 
procedural posture to better comprehend the conclusions and rulings of 
the district court. After discovery, AseraCare initially moved for 
summary judgment based on the Government’s failure to adduce 
evidence of the “falsity” element required for FCA claims.106 AseraCare 
asked the district court to apply a “reasonable doctor” standard for the 
purposes of assessing falsity under the FCA.107 The “reasonable doctor” 
standard would require the Government to show that any “reasonable 
physician applying his or her clinical judgment could not have held the 
opinion that the patient at issue was terminally ill.”108  Although the 
 
 98. Id. at 1285.  
 99. Id. at 1287. 
 100. Id.  
 101. Id. at 1288.  
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id.  
 105. Id.  
 106. Id. at 1285. 
 107. Id. at 1286. 
 108. Id. 
11
Steffel: End of Life Uncertainty
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2021
790 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 89 
district court found this standard “appealing and logical,” it ultimately 
decided not to apply it and denied AseraCare’s motion.109 In reasoning its 
denial, the court concluded that questions remained regarding whether 
clinical information and other documentation relied upon by AseraCare 
actually supported AseraCare’s “terminally ill” judgment.110  
Against the opposition of the Government, the district court next 
decided to bifurcate the trial into two phases: phase one on the falsity 
element and phase two on the remaining FCA elements.111 As a result, the 
Government’s witness testimony regarding AseraCare’s procedures and 
practices was allowed, but only to show context and not to rebut 
AseraCare’s own expert testimony.112 After the dueling expert opinions 
were presented in phase one of the trial, the case was sent to the jury, 
whose “sole job . . . was to review the medical records of each patient and 
decide which expert’s testimony seemed more persuasive”—a classic 
battle of the experts.113 The question presented to the jury was “whether 
a particular patient should [have been] characterized as ‘terminally ill’ at 
the time of certification.”114 Ultimately the jury answered special 
interrogatories regarding each of the 123 patients at issue and found false 
claims for 104 of the patients.115 
Unfortunately for the Government, the favorable partial jury verdict 
had a short lifespan. After the verdict, AseraCare moved for judgment as 
a matter of law, contending that the court applied the wrong legal standard 
in its jury instructions and again campaigned for the reasonable doctor 
standard.116 The district court agreed and ordered a new trial.117 The court 
concluded that proper jury instructions would have stated “(1) that the 
FCA’s falsity element requires proof of an objective falsehood; and (2) 
that a mere difference of opinion between physicians, without more, is 
not enough to show falsity.”118 However, the district court did not stop 
there. It reconsidered AseraCare’s motion for summary judgment under 
its newly adopted legal standard that required the Government to show an 
“objective falsehood” to create an issue of fact regarding the falsity 
element.119 Under this approach, the court granted summary judgment in 
 
 109. Id.  
 110. Id.  
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 1288.  
 113. Id.  
 114. Id.  
 115. Id. at 1289 
 116. Id. at 1289-90. 
 117. Id. at 1290. 
 118. Id.  
 119. Id. (The district court was able to reconsider summary judgment sua sponte under Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 56(f)(3).).  
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AseraCare’s favor because “the Government [had] failed to point the 
court to any admissible evidence to prove falsity other than [the doctor’s] 
opinion that medical records . . . did not support the Certification of 
Terminal Illness.”120 Since the government lacked evidence of an 
objective falsehood, it “could not prove the falsity element of its FCA 
claim as a matter of law.”121 
The Government appealed the decision. The Eleventh Circuit started 
its analysis by noting that the issue before the court was an issue of first 
impression.122 Specifically, the court “considered that standard for falsity 
in the context of the [MHB], where the controlling condition of 
reimbursement is a matter of clinical judgment.”123 The court summarized 
that the Government had essentially argued that dueling experts who 
disagree over whether a patient’s medical records support a prognosis of 
terminally ill was enough to raise a factual question that should be 
presented to a jury.124 On the other hand, the defendants argued that “the 
determinative inquiry in an eligibility analysis is whether the certifying 
physician exercised [a] genuine clinical judgment.”125 Further, as long as 
the clinical judgment was genuinely held, then the accuracy of the 
judgment was not a question of fact that a jury could decide was false.126 
Ultimately, the court concluded that it agreed with the “general sense” of 
the objectively false standard and agreed with the district court that the 
jury instructions were inadequate.127 
The Eleventh Circuit started by determining how the claim before the 
court may fall under the FCA. The court believed there was two possible 
representations that could have been deemed false under the FCA: (1) the 
representation by the physician to AseraCare that a patient was terminally 
ill, and (2) the representation by AseraCare to Medicare that the 
physician’s clinical judgment was obtained and, therefore, that the patient 
qualified as eligible for reimbursement.128 The focus of the case at hand 
was based on the first representation, the representation the physician 
made to AseraCare.129 Under this theory, once the hospice provider 
presented to Medicare the physician’s allegedly false representation of a 
patient’s terminally ill prognosis, the hospice provider was then deemed 
 
 120. Id.  
 121. Id.  
 122. Id. at 1291.  
 123. Id.  
 124. Id.  
 125. Id. at 1292. 
 126. Id.  
 127. Id. at 1291.  
 128. Id. at 1295, 1296.  
 129. Id. at 1296.  
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in violation of the FCA if the prognosis was, in fact, false.130 
Naturally, the question before the court became what exactly may deem 
a physician’s clinical judgment as “false.” The court looked almost 
exclusively to the text of the MHB statute and its regulations to find its 
answer.131 Overall, the court required that hospice providers must submit 
a claim that certifies a patient as terminally ill.132 The certification must 
be in writing, be based on a clinical judgment, and the reimbursement 
must be for payments that were “reasonable and necessary” for the 
management of the terminal illness.133 Further, the regulations required 
that “clinical information and other documentation . . . support the 
medical prognosis” and accompany the request for reimbursement.134  
The court further noted that the regulations often made room for 
subjectivity. For example, the required narrative explanation of the 
physician’s clinical judgment could not “contain check boxes or standard 
language” and must consider several factors including both “current 
subjective and objective medical findings.”135 Overall, the court 
emphasized that the regulations clearly made obtaining the physician’s 
clinical judgment the centerpiece of the MHB eligibility.136  
The main constraint on the clinical judgment was simply that the 
underlying medical documentation must support the judgment.137 
However, the regulations also emphasized that the nature of a clinical 
judgment is not a matter of medical fact.138 Moreover, the court reasoned 
that “none of the relevant language state[d] that the documentary record 
underpinning . . . [the] judgment must prove the prognosis,” and also cited 
where the regulations conceded that “predicting life expectancy is not an 
exact science” to explain why those who wrote the implementing 
regulations chose to show deference to the medical professional making 
the judgment.139 The court disagreed with the Government’s approach 
that underlying documentation must support the physician’s certification 
“as a factual matter.”140 Instead, “the relevant regulation requires only that 
clinical information and other documentation that support the medical 
prognosis . . . accompany the certification and be filed in the medical 
 
 130. Id.  
 131. Id. at 1292-95. 
 132. Id. at 1292. 
 133. Id. at 1293. 
 134. Id.  
 135. Id.  
 136. Id.  
 137. Id. at 1294. 
 138. Id. at 1293. 
 139. Id. (quoting 75 Fed. Reg. 70372, 70448).  
 140. Id. at 1294.  
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record.”141 Overall, as long as the clinical judgment represented a 
“reasonable interpretation of the relevant medical records, then the 
physician’s clinical judgment should dictate eligibility. “To conclude that 
the supporting documentation must, standing alone, prove the validity of 
the physician’s initial clinical judgment would read more into the legal 
framework than its language allows.”142 
The Government argued that the ruling essentially crippled the 
Government’s ability to bring FCA claims against hospice providers 
because all hospice providers would need to justify their request for 
reimbursement is a physician who was willing provide the hospice 
provider with a clinical judgment of their liking.143 However, in response 
to this fear, the court reminded the Government that the clinical judgment 
of a physician must be informed by the patient’s medical records.144 It 
also stated that if Congress had intended for a more rigid and objective 
standard for determining terminal illness, it would have used different 
language.145 Instead of requiring that medical records “support” the 
clinical judgment, it could have instead used “demonstrate” or “prove.”146 
Simply put, it was not the role of the court to require more certitude than 
the plain language of the statute and regulations implied; such reading 
was not consistent with the text or design of the law.147 
After holding that a “claim cannot be ‘false’—and thus not trigger FCA 
liability—if the underlying clinical judgment does not reflect an objective 
falsehood,” the court also commented on how plaintiffs could prove an 
objective falsehood moving forward.148 Evidence that a physician either 
failed to (1) review a patient’s medical records, (2) familiarize himself 
with the patient’s condition, or (3) subjectively believe the patient was 
terminally ill, could all prove an objective falsehood for FCA purposes.149 
The court also noted that evidence “that no reasonable physician could 
have concluded that a patient was terminally ill” would also suffice to 
show an objective falsity.150 In contrast, however, the court stated that “a 
properly formed and sincerely held clinical judgment [was] not untrue 
even if a different physician later contends the judgment [was] wrong.”151 
Overall, under the Eleventh Circuit’s approach, if a plaintiff alleges false 
 
 141. Id. (Internal quotes omitted. Emphasis omitted. Quoting 42 C.F.R. § 418.22(b)(2)).  
 142. Id.  
 143. Id. at 1295. 
 144. Id.  
 145. Id. at 1294. 
 146. Id.  
 147. Id. at 1294, 1295. 
 148. Id. at 1296, 1297. 
 149. Id. at 1297. 
 150. Id.  
 151. Id.  
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certification for hospice care, the plaintiff must identify “facts and 
circumstances surround[ing] the patient’s certification that are . . . [an] 
[im]proper exercise of a physician’s clinical judgment.”152 Due to the 
subjectivity of the clinical judgment and the deference shown to the 
physician’s judgment by the statute and regulations, the court articulated 
that future plaintiffs best rely on outside facts and circumstances to show 
the clinical judgment was not a genuinely held belief.  
B. United States ex rel. Druding v. Care Alternatives 
As in the AseraCare case, the relators in the Care Alternatives case 
consisted of former employees of the hospice care provider, Care 
Alternatives.153 The former employees similarly alleged that the company 
admitted patients for hospice care who should have been illegible for 
MHB.154 Moreover, they alleged that Care Alternatives directed its 
employees to improperly alter patients’ Medicare certifications to reflect 
eligibility.155 Unlike in AseraCare, the government declined to intervene, 
but the relators decided to proceed with the claim.156 
At the district court level, the central question surrounded the falsity 
element of the FCA claim.157 Discovery led to “dueling expert opinions” 
regarding whether the underlying medical documentation supported the 
clinical judgment of terminally ill.158 The relators had a doctor examine 
the records of forty-seven past patients.159 The doctor testified that the 
documentation was unsupportive of a terminally ill certification in thirty-
five percent of the patient files he reviewed.160 The expert also went a step 
further and testified that, in his view, “any reasonable physician would 
have reached the conclusion he reached.”161 Care Alternatives also 
presented their own expert witness who testified that, in his opinion, “a 
physician could have reasonably determined” that each patient in question 
was, in fact, terminally ill.162  
Care Alternatives then moved for summary judgment.163 Relying on 
the objective falsehood standard, Care Alternatives argued that the 
 
 152. Id. 
 153. Care Alternatives, 952 F.3d 89, 91 (3d Cir. 2020). 
 154. Id.  
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. at 93. 
 157. Id. at 91.  
 158. Id. at 94.  
 159. Id. at 91. 
 160. Id.  
 161. Id. at 94.  
 162. Id. 
 163. Id.  
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plaintiffs “could not make out the four prima facie elements of a claim 
under the FCA,” most importantly the element of falsity.164 The district 
court granted Care Alternative’s motion and based its opinion entirely on 
the plaintiff’s failure to show falsity.165 In reaching its conclusion, the 
court relied on the ruling in AseraCare and held that a “mere difference 
of opinion between physicians, without more, is not enough to show 
falsity.”166 The crux of the court’s decision also relied on the premise that 
“medical opinions are subjective and cannot be false.”167  
On appeal, the Third Circuit started its analysis by discussing the MHB. 
The Third Circuit generally agreed with the AseraCare court about what 
providers must show to Medicare for reimbursement for patients 
diagnosed as terminally ill.168 The court also highlighted that the 
regulations declared that determining the timespan of a patient’s illness 
was an inexact science.169 However, the court stated that inexactness 
“does not negate the fact that there must be clinical basis for the 
certification.”170 
 However, the Third Circuit entirely departed from AseraCare 
regarding what exactly was needed under the FCA to show falsity.171 The 
“central question” before the court on appeal was whether a claim for 
reimbursement may be considered false under the FCA if a medical expert 
testifies that accompanying medical documentation does not support a 
patient’s prognosis of terminally ill.172 The court answered that question 
with a “straightforward yes.”173 The court explicitly declined to adopt the 
objective falsity standard and claimed the standard was inconsistent with 
statute.174 Further, the court opined that the objective falsity standard 
conflated the FCA elements of “falsity” and “scienter” into one 
analysis.175 Instead, the court found that conflicting medical testimony 
created a genuine dispute of material fact as to the element of falsity.176 
Fundamental to the circuit court’s opinion was the meaning of “false” 
 
 164. Id.  
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 167. Id. (quoting United States ex rel. Riley v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Hosp., 355 F.3d 370, 376 (5th 
Cir. 2004)).  
 168. Id. at 92. 
 169. Id. at 93. 
 170. Id.   
 171. Id. at 95.  
 172. Id.  
 173. Id.  
 174. Id.  
 175. Id. 96. 
 176. Id. at 95. 
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under the FCA statute.177 “False” was an undefined term in the statute, so 
the court looked to common law to find its meaning.178 Under common 
law, the court identified two ways a claim may be false: legal falsity and 
factual falsity.179 Factual falsity occurred when “facts contained within 
the claim were untrue.”180 Legal falsity occurred when a claimant “falsely 
certifies that it has complied with a statute or regulation” for which 
compliance “is a condition for government payment,” when, in fact, they 
have not complied with the statute.181 Therefore, if Care Alternatives 
wrongfully certified that a patient was eligible for reimbursement, then 
Care Alternatives would have made a false statement under the legal 
falsity theory.182 In the circuit court’s opinion, the district court had 
limited its analysis to factual falsity by implementing the objective 
falsehood standard.183 Under the legal falsity standard, the relators could 
show that the Care Alternatives’ physician certification failed to meet the 
regulatory requirement that clinical information and other documentation 
supported a “terminally ill” prognosis.184 Under this theory, the court 
stated that “disagreement between experts . . . may be evidence” of a legal 
falsity, which would satisfy the falsity element of the FCA.185 Lastly, to 
support the idea of legal falsity, the court also relied on the Polukoff case 
to demonstrate the appropriateness of using both factual and legal falsity 
to evidence falsity under the FCA.186 
The court also rejected the district court’s “bright-line rule that a 
doctor’s clinical judgment cannot be false.”187 For this point, the court 
relied on the Sixth Circuit’s Paulus opinion, which emphasized that 
medical professional’s “opinions are not, and haven never been, 
completely insulated from scrutiny.”188 Specifically, the court used 
Paulus to highlight that a medical opinion that is not honestly held “may 
trigger liability for fraud.”189 However, the court also suggested that “a 
good faith medical opinion is not punishable.”190 Overall, it was the 
 
 177. Id.  
 178. Id.  
 179. Id. at 96. 
 180. Id.  
 181. Id.  
 182. Id. at 97. “In other words, our cases instruct that FCA falsity simply asks whether the claim 
submitted to the government as reimbursable was in fact reimbursable, based on the conditions for 
payment set by the government.” 
 183. Id.   
 184. Id. 
 185. Id.  
 186. Id. (citing 10th circuit’s Polukoff and the 3rd circuit’s Paulus cases). 
 187. Id. at 98. (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 188. Id. (citing United States v. Paulus,894 F.3d 267,275 (6th Cir. 2018)).  
 189. Id.   
 190. Id.  
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court’s belief that the question of whether a defendant had committed 
fraud by misrepresenting underlying medical documentation or had acted 
in good faith was a suitable question for a jury to decide.191 In the court’s 
opinion, it was clear that the credibility of expert testimony was 
“exclusively” a judgment for the jury.192 
The Third Circuit also addressed the AseraCare ruling and why it chose 
to depart from its sister circuit.193 Specifically, the court highlighted the 
difference in the framing of the falsity question by the Government and 
the hospice provider.194 Under the Government’s framing in AseraCare, 
clinical information and accompanying documents must actually support 
the physician’s certification.195 Whereas from the defendant’s point of 
view, the supporting documentation requirement was “only designed to 
address the mandate that there be a medical basis for the certification.196 
By adopting the approach suggested by AseraCare, the Third Circuit 
believed that its sister court “limited the relevant inquiry to whether the 
Government had adduced sufficient evidence to the accuracy of the 
physician’s . . . judgment.”197 In the Third Circuit’s opinion, this 
essentially excluded legal falsity and made plaintiffs rely entirely on 
factual falsity.198  
The Third Circuit also suggested that the Eleventh Circuit “determined 
that clinical judgments cannot be untrue” because it held that “a 
reasonable difference of opinion among physicians . . . is not sufficient 
on its own” to show falsity under the FCA.”199 Again, the Third Circuit 
believed this approach limited falsity to factual falsity.200 In the end, on 
the basis of legal falsity, the court held that physician expert testimony 
that disagrees with the hospice provider’s certification does in fact create 
a triable issue of fact that should be left for a jury to decide.201 In the case 
at hand, the relators’ physician-expert testimony provided sufficient 
evidence to create a triable issue of fact regarding falsity.202 
 
 191. Id.  
 192. Id.  
 193. Id. at 98-100. 
 194. Id. at 99.  
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IV. DISCUSSION 
AseraCare, Care Alternatives, and the other previously discussed cases 
highlight a growing tension regarding how exactly plaintiffs are supposed 
to demonstrate the falsity element of the FCA in the hospice context. 
More specifically, does the plain language of the FCA and MHB statutes 
and regulations require more than simply dueling expert testimony to 
create a triable issue of fact that should be presented to a jury? Care 
Alternatives certainly suggests the answer to that question is a 
straightforward no.203 However, although Care Alternatives characterizes 
the AseraCare holding as providing an inappropriate “bright-line rule” 
based on objective falsity, the AseraCare holding does nothing of the sort. 
First, AseraCare does not create a bright-line rule. In fact, AseraCare 
implicitly considered legal falsity as well as factual falsity in the premise 
of its analysis.204 Secondly, based on the plain language of the statute and 
regulations governing end-of-life treatment, the law purposely grants a 
large amount of deference to a physician’s clinical judgment of terminal 
illness because of the highly subjective nature of the judgment compared 
to other areas of medical expertise. Moving forward, courts should move 
away from the Care Alternatives holding and realign themselves with the 
logic and holding of the AseraCare court.  
The objective falsehood standard adopted in AseraCare (1) covers both 
factual and legal falsity, (2) does not create a bright-line rule, and (3) is 
the more appropriate reading of the statute based on Congress’ desire to 
grant flexibility to the physician making a judgment. This is not to say 
that a physician’s clinical judgment should never be questioned or 
subjected to a jury’s scrutiny. Rather, to create a triable issue of fact as to 
whether a physician’s clinical judgment was “false,” a plaintiff must first 
demonstrate underlying facts that support an inference that the physician 
did not honestly hold the clinical judgment he or she made. Of course, a 
plaintiff may always present facts that demonstrate a clinical judgment 
was inappropriate because the physician did not meet or perform one of 
the other explicit requirements necessary under statute to make an 
appropriate clinical judgment. 
A. Factual and Legal Falsity Are Both Considered Under AseraCare’s 
“Objective Falsehood” Standard 
One of the prominent reasons that Care Alternatives decided to depart 
from its sister court’s AseraCare ruling was because the Care Alternatives 
court believed the objective falsehood standard limited falsity to factual 
 
 203. Id. at 95.  
 204. Supra Part IV.A. 
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falsity and disregarded legal falsity.205 In reality, the AseraCare objective 
falsehood standard accounts for legal falsity as well as factual falsity. 
First, the objective falsehood standard can be applied to the requirement 
that medical documentation accompanying the certification of terminal 
illness “supports” the certification. Plaintiffs may still evidence falsity 
under the legal falsity theory by inquiring whether clinical information 
and other documentation accompanying a certification of terminal illness 
supports the physician’s certification. In fact, this is the exact approach 
the Government took in both AseraCare and Care Alternatives.  
The court in AseraCare did not have an issue with the Government 
evidencing falsity under legal falsity theory. Rather, the issue was that the 
Government only provided an expert who said he personally disagreed 
with the doctor.206 Moreover, the Government’s expert witness could not 
say that another doctor “who disagreed with him . . . was necessarily 
wrong.”207 As the court stated in AseraCare, the dueling expert witnesses 
simply “fundamentally differed as to how a doctor should analyze a 
patient’s life expectancy.”208 The Government did not succeed on their 
claim for that exact reason. It is important to distinguish the court’s issue 
with the lack of evidence from their overall framing of falsity. Plainly, the 
AseraCare court did not take issue with evidencing falsity through legal 
falsity; in fact, the court’s analysis implicitly supported its reasoning. 
Instead, the real issue was that the Government lacked any evidence to 
legal falsity other than its expert’s opinion, which the court concluded 
was insufficient.  
It is simply wrong to state that AseraCare did not consider a legal 
falsity theory. The objective falsehood standard was not implemented to 
cabin falsity to just factual falsity. Instead, it simply required that 
something more than a difference in opinion was necessary to explain 
why the defendant’s clinical judgment was false. The objective falsehood 
 
 205. Care Alternatives, 952 F.3d at 96.“Objective falsity standard is also at odds with this Court’s 
cases that have interpreted falsity to encompass a theory of liability based on non-compliance with 
regulatory instructions and not just objectively verifiable facts.” (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 206. United States v. AseraCare, Inc., 938 F.3d 1278, 1287 (11th Cir. 2019). The Government 
presented expert testimony that, in the expert’s own clinical judgment “the medical records of the patients 
at issue did not support . . . terminal illness.” (internal quotation marks omitted). The court’s issue was 
not with how the Government framed falsity under legal falsity theory. Rather the issue was that there 
was no other evidence on record besides the medical expert’s personal opinion that the Defendant’s 
clinical judgments were false. The court made this abundantly clear when later it stated, “a plaintiff 
alleging that a patient was falsely certified . . . must identify facts and circumstances surrounding the 
patient’s certification that are inconsistent with . . . proper . . . judgment.” Id. at 1297. 
 207. Id. at 1287, 1288. (The Government’s expert witness even “himself changed his opinion 
concerning the eligibility of certain patients over the course of the proceeding.”). Later, he explained his 
change of opinion on the fact that he “was not the same physician” three year previous than he was now. 
Id. at 1288. This in of itself serves as evidence to the overall incredibly subjective nature of the “terminal 
illness” clinical judgment. 
 208. Id. 
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standard still allows plaintiffs to raise a question of falsity under legal 
falsity, it simply requires underlying objective facts that support the 
apparent disagreement between doctors.209 Due to the highly subjective 
nature of a terminally ill clinical judgment, this requirement is justified. 
Without such a requirement, all a plaintiff would need to find to create a 
triable issue of fact is a single doctor who was willing to disagree with the 
defendant-doctor’s judgment, after an ex post review of the supporting 
documents.  
Second, AseraCare held that a disagreement between experts, without 
more, does not create a triable issue of fact.210 This framing does not 
foreclose a legal falsity theory of liability. It just means that another 
expert’s opinion alone cannot raise a triable issue of fact regarding legal 
falsity. Instead, to raise a question of legal falsity, there needs to be an 
underlying fact that plaintiffs may point to and say, “this is why my expert 
is right and the defense’s expert was wrong.” Under this approach, 
plaintiffs may raise a triable issue of fact based on legal falsity, but the 
legal falsity must be based on something objective. Doing so does not 
dismantle legal falsity. Instead, it helps to make sure that juries are not 
making purely medical judgments or simply deciding which doctor’s 
opinion they like best.  
Paulus is a fitting example where the plaintiffs applied legal falsity 
theory to question whether clinical information actually supported the 
physician’s judgment that the amount of blockage made a stent procedure 
necessary.211 In Paulus, experts were not debating medical theory. 
Instead, the court noted that the amount of artery blockage that appeared 
on an angiogram was an objective fact that may be proven true or false 
and that the jury could decide.212 This is a textbook example of legal 
falsity; however, the amount of blockage the doctor reported was an 
underlying objective fact that could have passed the objective falsehood 
standard of AseraCare. The plaintiff in Paulus had experts who disagreed, 
but it also had more. What moved the disagreement from a medical debate 
to a triable issue of fact was the objective percentage of blockage shown 
on the reports. A jury could decide whether the defendant-doctor lied 
about the blockage he witnessed on the angiogram. On the other hand, in 
AseraCare, the plaintiffs did not supply any other evidence of falsity 
besides their disagreeing expert.213  
 
 209. AseraCare, 938 F.3d at 1301. “[T]he mere difference of reasonable opinion between 
physicians, without more . . . does not constitute an objective falsehood.” (emphasis added). 
 210. Id. 
 211. United States v. Paulus, 894 F.3d 267, 270 (6th Cir. 2018). 
 212. Id. at 275. “We make it explicit now: The degree of stenosis is a fact capable of proof or 
disproof.” 
 213. AseraCare, 938 F.3d at 1290. “The Government [had] failed to point the court to any 
admissible evidence to prove falsity other than [the doctor’s] opinion.” 
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B. The Objective Falsehood Standard Does Not Create A Bright-Line 
Rule Protecting Medical Professionals 
The Care Alternatives court’s characterization214 of AseraCare’s 
objective falsehood standard as a bright-line rule that a doctor’s clinical 
judgment cannot be “false,” is simply a misunderstanding of the objective 
falsehood standard. The objective falsehood standard modestly requires 
that some underlying fact(s) be present to suggest falsity besides an 
expert’s contrary medical opinion.215 In fact, the AseraCare case laid out 
multiple avenues a plaintiff may take to prove a doctor’s clinical judgment 
was false.216 The only bright-line rule created by the objective falsehood 
standard is that there needs to be more than a medical disagreement 
among experts to evidence falsity.217 In fact, the standard even leaves 
open the possibility for a purely medical disagreement to pass the 
objective falsehood test by having an expert testify that “no reasonable 
physician could have concluded a patient was terminally ill given the 
relevant medical records.”218 In this case, the objective falsehood standard 
would likely require an underlying reason as to why no doctor could have 
held the clinical judgment, but that could be supported by standard 
medical practices in the same way standard medical practices were used 
to support evidence falsity in the Paulus case.219 Altogether, the objective 
falsehood standard is far from a bright-line rule that protects physicians’ 
judgments under all circumstances. To the contrary, AseraCare carved 
out multiple specific ways that a plaintiff can evidence falsity of a 
physician’s clinical judgment under the objective falsehood rule.    
C. The Overall Policy Objectives of the MHB Purposely Grant 
Deference to Doctors’ Clinical Judgments of Terminal Illness 
It can still be argued that requiring underlying objective facts to create 
a triable issue on falsity under the legally false theory is too large of a 
 
 214. Care Alternatives, 952 F.3d 89, 98 (3d Cir. 2020). 
 215. AseraCare, 938 F.3d at 1290. 
 216. Id.at 1297. “Certifying physician fails to review patient’s medical records or otherwise 
familiarize himself with the patient’s condition . . . [or] physician did not, in fact, subjectively believe that 
his patient was terminally ill . . . [or] no reasonable physician could have concluded that [the] patient was 
terminally ill given the relevant medical records.” The court continued, “In each of these examples, the 
clinical judgment on which the claim is based contains a flaw that can be demonstrated through verifiable 
facts.” 
 217. Id. “[A] reasonable difference of opinion among physicians reviewing medical documentation 
ex post is not sufficient on its own to suggest . . . claims . . . are false under the FCA.”  
 218. Id.  
 219. United States v. Paulus, 894 F.3d 267, 271-72 (6th Cir. 2018). The court used both “the 
accepted standard of medical care” and what “the medical consensus appears to be” to help determine 
whether a stent was justified at certain varying levels of blockage. Id. 
23
Steffel: End of Life Uncertainty
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2021
802 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 89 
burden to place on plaintiffs bringing FCA actions. Although the 
requirement makes bringing an action against hospice providers more 
difficult,220 more importantly, it aligns with the general deference given 
to medical professionals by statutes and regulations.  
From a holistic view, the regulations and rulemaking commentary 
repeatedly suggest that a physician’s clinical judgment should be granted 
deference because of the subjectivity involved in physicians’ clinical 
judgments. First, the regulations explicitly declare that predicting life 
expectancy is not an exact science. Second, for this reason, the regulations 
allow for unlimited recertification of patients’ terminal illness. At the end 
of the day, even in an ex post review, doctors are not always capable of 
predicting the exact time or timeframe when individuals die. Third, again 
due to the natural subjectivity of an individual’s health, the regulations 
require that physicians consider “several factors” and both “subjective 
and objective medical findings.” Finally, the regulations specifically 
disallow using “check the box” language in a physician’s narrative 
explanation for terminal illness. 
All these factors illustrate that the judgments physicians are asked to 
make are naturally complex and inexact. It is unfair to then have these 
judgments second-guessed ex post facto by a jury or their professional 
peers. Based on the number of factors that a physician is required to 
consider under the regulations, two different physicians can both consult 
the same factors, but can come to opposite clinical judgments based on 
how each physician weighs each individual factor. For this reason, it 
makes sense require some underlying objective fact that points to 
wrongness in an opposing physician’s point-of-view. Without an 
underlying objective fact, dueling expert opinions offer nothing more than 
simply a difference in medical theory and opinion. Furthermore, based on 
the regulations’ clear understanding of the subjectivity in the medical 
decision, one cannot say that a mere difference in medical opinion alone 
makes another physician’s opinion false.  The Government’s expert 
witness in AseraCare admitted as much when he reached the opposite 
conclusion of AseraCare’s doctor but could not say this meant that the 
other doctor’s opinion was wrong.  
Respecting the deference shown to medical professionals in the statute 
is especially important in the hospice setting. Care Alternatives relied on 
both Polukoff and Paulus as examples of when a medical judgment can 
be considered false.221 Although both cases do exemplify when a medical 
judgment may be deemed false, it is equally important to appreciate the 
 
 220. See Christopher J. Donovan, Lisa M. Noller & Lori A. Rubin, AseraCare FCA Ruling Is A 
Boon For Health Providers, FOLEY & LARDNER LLP (Jan. 31, 2020), 
https://www.foley.com/en/insights/publications/2020/01/aseracare-fca-ruling-boon-for-health-providers.  
 221. Care Alternatives, 952 F.3d 89, 97-98 (3d Cir. 2020). 
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difference in type of medical opinions questioned in Polukoff and Paulus 
versus AseraCare and Care Alternatives.  
AseraCare and Care Alternatives questioned physicians’ clinical 
judgments of terminal illness. As previously discussed, these judgments 
are, medically speaking, incredibly subjective judgments that medical 
professionals are required to made to determine hospice eligibility. When 
no other evidence is presented as to the falsity of a physician’s clinical 
judgment, juries are essentially asked to perform an after-the-fact review 
to determine which expert-opinion testimony and medical theory is more 
persuasive. Ideally, a jury would weigh all of the same factors medical 
professionals are asked to weigh and somehow determine from those 
factors, without a medical degree, which expert was correct; or at a 
minimum, whether the plaintiff’s expert-testimony was persuasive 
enough that the jury believed the defendant’s clinical judgment was false. 
Alternatively, Polukoff and Paulus required juries to make a much less 
medically intensive judgment. In both cases, the jury had to decide on an 
underlying objective fact that did not require jurors to have a medical 
degree to understand. In Paulus, the jury needed to decide whether the 
blockage that the cardiologist reported on his reports was actually present 
on the angiogram. Essentially, the question was whether the doctor lied 
and misrepresented what he saw. In Polukoff, the question was whether 
the doctor’s patients had the pre-existing conditions to justify 
reimbursement for their surgeries, or whether the doctor lied about the 
underlying reason for the procedure and created punctures in patients’ 
hearts to justify reimbursement. In the end, both the Polukoff and Paulus 
juries considered whether the doctor lied or misrepresented facts, not 
which doctors’ medical theories made more sense to them from a 
layman’s perspective.  
Both Polukoff and Paulus are examples of when a doctor’s clinical 
judgment is false for the purposes of the FCA. However, both also 
represent cases that involved underlying facts and circumstances that a 
jury of laymen can decide without needing medical educations. 
Conversely, the jurors in AseraCare and Care Alternatives were asked to 
perform more complex and medically intensive analyses than the 
previous Polukoff and Paulus jurors. Due to the number of factors a 
physician is required to consider under the MHB guidelines, and the 
overall subjectivity of projecting an individual’s projected lifespan 
generally, juries are simply incapable of concluding, as a matter of law, 
that a clinical judgment of terminal illness is false, without any other 
evidence to rely on besides contradicting expert testimony.  
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D. Stricter Scrutiny of Medical Professionals Should be Accomplished 
Through Congress, Not Courts  
If the system needs a tougher “check” on doctors in the hospice setting, 
the place to look is Congress, who wrote the statutes in a way that granted 
the doctors a large degree of deference. It is simply not the courts’ job to 
re-write the law to require stricter scrutiny of doctors’ clinical judgments 
of terminal illness as the courts see fit. The plain language of the MHB 
regulations clearly conveys that Congress has an appreciation for the 
variety of subjective factors that should go into a physician’s clinical 
judgment, as well as an appreciation for the general difficulty in 
predicting how long a sick or elderly person is likely to live.  
The law is written in a way that generally insulates physicians’ clinical 
judgments of terminal illness from scrutiny, but does not entirely insulate 
the judgments from examination.  The regulations still set forth a variety 
of requirements that a hospice provider must meet in order to be 
reimbursed under Medicare. If a hospice provider or its medical 
professionals fail to meet the necessary requirements and wrongfully 
certify compliance, then those professionals can still be liable for their 
actions. Also, hospice providers may be held liable if they did not 
genuinely hold a belief that a patient was terminally ill or held a belief 
based on medical factors that were untrue. Under all of these 
circumstances, all that is required of plaintiffs is to show that their beliefs 
are evidenced by some underlying objective facts that demonstrate their 
belief.  
In doing so, two things are accomplished: (1) medical professionals are 
protected against lawsuits in scenarios where reasonable differences in 
medical opinions exist; and (2) juries are not asked to make medical 
judgments they are incapable of making due to their lack of medical 
education. By requiring some underlying objective facts to demonstrate 
how a medical judgment was wrong, juries make rulings on facts that have 
medical implications, instead of making purely medical judgments.  
V. CONCLUSION 
Overall, AseraCare, Care Alternatives, and previous cases highlight a 
growing tension regarding how exactly plaintiffs are supposed to 
demonstrate the falsity element of the FCA in the context of the hospice 
setting. More specifically, does the plain language of the FCA and MHB 
statutes and regulations require more than simply dueling expert 
testimony to create a triable issue of fact for a jury? Care Alternatives 
certainly suggests the answer to that question is a straightforward no. 
However, although Care Alternatives characterizes the AseraCare 
holding as providing an inappropriate “bright-line rule” based on 
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objective falsity, in reality the AseraCare holding does nothing of that 
sort and is actually the more appropriate standard for courts to follow. 
Moving forward, courts should follow AseraCare and require more than 
mere dueling expert opinions to demonstrate falsity. 
First, AseraCare does not create a bright-line rule that the Care 
Alternatives court claims it does. In fact, AseraCare implicitly considered 
legal falsity as well as factual falsity in the premise of its analysis and 
provides multiple examples of how a physician’s clinical judgment can 
be proved false. Secondly, based on the plain language of the statutes and 
regulations governing end-of-life treatment, the law purposely grants a 
large amount of deference to physicians’ clinical judgments of terminal 
illness because of the comparatively highly subjective nature of the 
judgment.  
The objective falsity standard adopted in AseraCare (1) covers both 
factual and legal falsity, (2) does not create a bright-line rule, and (3) is 
the more appropriate reading of the statute based on Congress’ desire to 
grant flexibility to physicians making judgments. This is not to say that a 
physician’s clinical judgment should never be under scrutiny or submitted 
to a jury. Rather, to create a triable issue of fact regarding falsity of a 
clinical judgment, a plaintiff must evidence underlying facts that support 
the inference that the physician did not honestly hold the clinical 
judgment he or she made. Alternatively, the plaintiff can evidence facts 
that show the clinical judgment was inappropriately made because the 
physician did not meet or perform one of the other explicit requirements 
necessary under statute to make an appropriate clinical judgment. If 
individuals are not satisfied with the current standard, then Congress 
should act to tighten the standards and requirements of physicians in the 
hospice setting. Under no circumstance, however, is it appropriate for the 
courts to go beyond the requirements of the regulations and more strictly 
scrutinize medical professionals’ clinical judgments simply because the 
court believes it to be better policy. Moving forward, courts should follow 
the AseraCare ruling when determining whether a physician’s clinical 
judgment was false within the hospice setting.  
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